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The recent ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the ECB 
was an economic and political bombshell. The deep controversy that 
resulted – within Germany and on a European scale – illustrates that 
the ambiguity surrounding the euro area’s legal order and architec-
ture may have reached its limit. The ruling, combined with the plan to 
build a fiscal capacity to address the economic consequences of the 
coronavirus crisis, presents the EU with an important opportunity to 
complete and solidify the euro area. 
 – The gradual expansion of the ECB’s role to include supervision, 
macroprudential policy, financial stability, and others means that 
it needs a stronger legal footing for its actions, a clarification 
of its independence, and enhanced accountability to European 
institutions.
 – Because the European treaties prevent monetary financing and  
fiscal transfers, the possibility for the ECB to undertake policies that 
imply – even indirectly – such transfers needs to be clarified. 
 – The question of whether the EU is a construct of international public 
law in which member states retain ultimate supremacy or whether it 
is a legal and political order of a constitutional nature that binds its 
member states needs to be answered without ambiguity.
 – The recent Franco-German initiative for the European Recovery 
Fund, while so far falling short of a Hamiltonian moment, potentially 
raises important treaty issues. New fiscal instruments created to 
counter the current economic downturn should indeed be part of a 
sustainable legal and institutional package that underpins the inte-
gration of the EU and the euro area.
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On May 5, 2020, the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) ruled that 
decisions by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 
the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) exceed 
the competences of the European Union. The ruling 
was a bombshell for several reasons. 
First, the court questioned the lack of control exer-
cised by Germany’s government and parliament, the 
Bundestag, over the ECB’s operations, thereby rais-
ing a fundamental question about the central bank’s 
independence and threatening the Bundesbank’s 
participation in the PSPP. 
Second, while the BVerfG did not rule that PSPP 
violated the prohibition of monetary financing (Ar-
ticle 123 TFEU) or the no-bail out clause (Article 125 
TFEU), it raised questions about the proportionality 
assessment of the measures and whether this pro-
gram conformed to the narrow price stability man-
date of the ECB. 
Third, the ruling fundamentally upended the agree-
ment over the supremacy of EU law over nation-
al law and, therefore, of the European Court of Jus-
tice over national constitutional courts – a departure 
with potentially significant consequences because it 
questions the fundamental nature of the EU’s legal 
and political order.
Because the BVerfG’s ruling adds to the controver-
sy that has surrounded the architecture of the EU’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the cri-
ses in the euro area, it will certainly test the slightly 
reformed settlement that emerged after 2012, when 
then-president Mario Draghi announced that the 
ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the euro 
and the EU adjusted its fiscal rules, rescue mecha-
nisms, and financial supervisory architecture. Coin-
ciding with the coronavirus pandemic, the ruling re-
opens the fundamental debate around transfers and 
mutualization that had been brushed under the car-
pet since the previous crisis. 
There are, therefore, two main scenarios for how the 
EU and Germany can react to the ruling.
Scenario I: Muddling Through
Despite the importance of the ruling, muddling 
through in legal, economic, and financial terms is al-
1 It would only challenge the future integrity of the euro area if Berlin were to raise questions about its future participation or if the Bundesbank were to 
take more active steps to prepare for a possible end of the EMU, for instance by demanding that Target 2 balances be contained or collateralized.
ways possible. The European Union is, in fact, used 
to responding to crises in such a way and it can do 
it again here.
Legally speaking, the European Commission could 
formally launch an infringement procedure against 
Germany in response to the ruling, and the Bundes-
bank could try to answer the proportionality re-
quests of the BVerfG. Doing so would allow the 
dance of the judges between Luxembourg and Karl-
sruhe to carry on. 
Economically, despite Germany’s objections, the rul-
ing may have only limited impact because the ECB 
could very well carry on with its purchase program 
without the participation of the Bundesbank. Other 
national central banks or the ECB itself could inter-
vene in PSPP in its stead. Thus, in the short term, the 
BVerfG’s decision would not fundamentally under-
mine the operation of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ESCB) and the functioning of the euro ar-
ea. If, however, the Bundesbank were to eventually 
end its participation in PSPP, it would be a terrible 
sign of isolation for Germany and would raise legit-
imate questions about the long-term sustainability 
of the euro.1 
Scenario II: A Political Response
The decision of the German Constitutional Court 
raises fundamental questions that touch upon the 
political nature of the euro area and its institutional 
setup. While the court has been heavily criticized in 
pro-European circles, posing these challenges is no 
act of anti-Europeanness as such. The BVerfG may 
well have a political agenda, but it raises issues that 
have been evaded for too long.
It is now important to seize the momentum and re-
spond politically by exploring the ways in which to 
implement two things: a change to the EU’s primary 
law and, potentially, a change to the German Consti-
tution. Indeed, while treaty (and constitutional) re-
forms are often presented as being beyond reach, a 
number of elements of a constitutional dimension 
have, in fact, been added to the incomplete gover-
nance of the euro area since the euro was created by 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1999. As a result of crises in 
the euro area, several elements – such as reform of 
the EU’s fiscal rules and the creation of common fi-
nancial supervision – were introduced via second-
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ary law. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and the Fiscal Stability Treaty (TSCG) were, for ex-
ample, created on the basis of intergovernmental 
treaties outside the EU’s institutional setup as well 
as limited treaty revision including the modifica-
tion of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). This simplified revision 
procedure not only allowed for the politically com-
plex ordinary procedure to be circumvented, result-
ing in fairly rapid implementation, but it also proved 
that changes of a constitutional nature (i.e. to TSCG) 
as well as revisions of EU Treaties (i.e. to Article 136 
TFEU) are entirely possible. 
The BVerfG’s recent ruling suggests that some issues 
can only be solved through a broader European con-
versation that could lead to a new institutional and 
constitutional settlement for the euro area. These 
are the three main questions that need answering: 
1. Is the independence of the Central Bank so abso-
lute that it is truly beyond the control and outside 
the democratic accountability of both national and 
European institutions? 
2. If the European treaties specifically prevent mon-
etary financing (Article 123 TFEU) and fiscal transfers 
through the assumption of debt issued by a member 
state (Article 125 TFEU), can the monetary authority 
undertake policies that amount – even if indirectly – 
to such transfers? 
3. Perhaps most importantly, is the EU a construct 
of international public law in which member 
states retain ultimate supremacy, or is it a legal 
and political order of a constitutional nature 
that, therefore, binds all its member states?
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
The BVerfG argues that the Bundestag and the Ger-
man government have failed to control the ECB’s 
actions sufficiently:
“Based on their responsibility with regard to European 
integration (Integrationsverantwortung), the Federal 
Government and the German Bundestag have a du-
ty to take active steps against the PSPP in its current 
form. … Specifically, this means that, based on their 
2 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “ECB decisions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme exceed EU competences,” Press Release No. 32/2020 of May 2, 2020: 
<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2020/bvg20-032.html> (accessed May 19, 2020).
responsibility with regard to European integration 
(Integrationsverantwortung), the Federal Government 
and the Bundestag are required to take steps seeking 
to ensure that the ECB conducts a proportionality as-
sessment. This applies accordingly with regard to the 
reinvestments under the PSPP that began on 1 Janu-
ary 2019 and the restart of the programme as of 1 No-
vember 2019. In this respect, the Federal Government 
and the Bundestag also have a duty to continue moni-
toring the decisions of the Eurosystem on the purchas-
es of government bonds under the PSPP and use the 
means at their disposal to ensure that the ESCB stays 
within its mandate.”2
The German Constitutional Court’s claim that Ger-
man institutions should hold the ECB accountable 
seems to run against two fundamental principles 
that define the European Central Bank’s position in 
the EU system. First, Article 130 TFEU created pos-
sibly one of the most independent central banks in 
history. Second, Article 248 (3) TFEU established that 
the ECB is accountable to the European Parliament 
and Council – to which the president of the ECB 
addresses an annual report on the activities of the 
ESCB and monetary policy, on the basis of which 
they may hold a general debate; it is not, however, 
accountable to national parliaments or the govern-
ments of individual member states.
Consequently, the natural response of the ECB and 
European institutions is to consider central bank in-
dependence to be unquestionable. Nevertheless, the 
increasing role that the ECB plays in policies with 
distributional consequences has created a grow-
ing and valid debate about accountability. Over the 
past ten years, the ESCB has grown to play a cen-
tral role in macroprudential policy, which clearly ex-
panded its impact beyond its original price stabili-
ty mandate. In regard to banking supervision, the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism created in 2013 added 
– on the basis of the fairly slim provisions of Article 
127 (6) TFEU – an implicit financial stability mandate 
to its responsibilities. Moreover, the ECB is de fac-
to playing a growing role in credit allocation through 
its long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO), and as-
set purchases programs, which were launched start-
ing in 2011 to stabilize financial markets in the course 
of the sovereign debt and banking crises. While these 
moves were accompanied by growing – albeit insuf-
ficient – efforts by the ECB to improve the trans-
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parency of its decisions, accountability has not im-
proved proportionally. 
Now, the ECB is already a key player in the EU’s re-
sponse to the COVID-19 crisis. In addition, it might 
eventually play an important role in supporting a 
green transition to address climate change as part 
of the ongoing revision of its operational framework. 
While probably justified, the policies that central 
banks are currently undertaking in response to such 
developments are, in fact, merely a return to the role 
central banks played until the great monetarist revo-
lution of the late 1970s. Then, central bank policy was 
under the control of more accountable institutions 
and, ultimately, governments. In recent years, grow-
ing financialization has given central banks a more 
critical role in backstopping the financial system. 
Central banks have not only remained lenders of last 
resort to banks, but they have also become dealers of 
last resort to stabilize the flow of collateral – the new 
lifeblood of the whole financial system. 
With its ruling, the German Constitutional Court 
is possibly inadvertently, but potentially very apt-
ly, questioning whether modern central banking re-
quires a whole new set of democratic checks and 
balances, something economic historian Adam Tooze 
refers to as a new “financial constitution.”3 In this 
sense, and rather ironically, if Berlin were to follow 
this ruling, it might start an important conversation 
about central banking and accountability that has 
been avoided for years. 
Such a conversation could eventually lead to calls 
for revising Article 130 TFEU, which establishes the 
ECB’s absolute independence. It could also bring 
about other changes in the treaty, including provi-
sions to offer a more solid legal basis for ECB action 
in financial supervision and resolution – something 
the ECB has proposed, for example, to justify its role 
in the supervision of non-bank actors for which it 
currently has no mandate. In addition, the conver-
sation could lead to amendments to the ECB’s man-
date and statutes that could provide more solid foot-
ing for its growing role in economic policy, financial 
stability, supervision, climate change, and, possibly, 
employment. 
The key question is whether these changes should 
be enshrined in primary law or whether they could 
actually take place through changes in the doctrine 
3 Adam Tooze, “The Death of the Central Bank Myth,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/european-central-bank-myth-
monetary-policy-german-court-ruling/#> (accessed May 20, 2020).
alone. Indeed, the mandate can be interpreted in a 
way that is sufficiently flexible to allow for the ECB 
to introduce new responsibilities gradually. Account-
ability could also be greatly enhanced by two mea-
sures. First, by improving transparency, for example, 
by making the votes of members of ECB’s govern-
ing council public. And second, by turning the tooth-
less and cordial “monetary policy dialogues” current-
ly held by the European Parliament into proper and 
more frequent formal hearings – possibly not only of 
the ECB’s president, but also of other board mem-
bers in areas pertaining to financial supervision, 
macroprudential policy, and monetary policy imple-
mentation. A more active European Parliament and a 
more collaborative ECB could create the framework 
for greater transparency and accountability. 
Still, there are also clear advantages to pushing for 
changes to the TFEU. Such changes would enshrine 
the expanded competence of the ECB in law that 
would be politically and unanimously sanctioned. 
The new legal basis would, therefore, answer and 
put to rest the concerns expressed by the German 
Constitutional Court, which largely result from its 
narrow definition of proportionality and the ECB’s 
mandate. Changing the TFEU, though, requires 
political consensus that might be very difficult and 
protracted to obtain. All 27 EU member states – even 
those that are not part of the euro area – would have 
to accept the treaty change and ratify it, which in 
some cases may require national referenda. Con-
sequently, a change to the doctrine rather than to 
the TFEU may seem to be the preferable solution 
although it does not provide the legal certainty upon 
which the euro area should be operating.
Berlin might start an 
important conversation 
about central banking 
and accountability
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THE MAASTRICHT CONUNDRUM
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 set the goal of creat-
ing a European Monetary Union and prescribes its 
basic architecture. Its provisions for setting up such 
a union are a compromise among competing visions, 
in particular with regard to the respective roles of 
monetary and budgetary policy and risk sharing. The 
treaty specifically rules out bail-outs for EU mem-
ber states and, by extension, excludes debt mutual-
ization and transfers, but it does so ambiguously. 
The German Constitutional Court did not rule that 
PSPP violates Article 123 TFEU, which prohibits mon-
etary financing. Its argument about proportionality, 
however, rightly questions – although in a somewhat 
oblique manner – whether the ECB’s purchase pro-
gram amounts to economic policy. The ECB not on-
ly has no mandate to create such policy, but doing so 
would, in fact, violate principles that have been en-
shrined in the EU Treaty since Maastricht. 
The BVerfG’s concern about the principle of pro-
portionality is formal in that the court suggests that 
PSPP does not respect the limits of EU competen-
cies as laid out in Article 5 TEU and possibly violates 
the separation of competencies between the EU level 
and that of its member states. But the BVerfG’s con-
cern is also substantive in that it suggests that PSPP, 
by possibly indirectly encroaching on member states’ 
economic policies, could in effect allow governments 
mutualization and transfers by stealth, causing them 
to essentially violate the Maastricht settlement. 
While it can be upsetting from an economic and po-
litical perspective that the German Constitution-
al Court does not comprehend that there is no clear 
line in proportionality and no absolute separation be-
tween monetary policy and other distributional pol-
icies, it is nonetheless legitimate for the court to ask 
whether these operations and their consequences 
are fully in line with European treaties. But it is prob-
lematic that, time and again, European governments 
have deliberately accepted that the ECB under-
writes policies that they were not prepared to under-
take or sanction politically themselves – for exam-
ple, the transfers embedded in the operations of the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), the financial 
support provided to the Irish government with the 
4 European Council, “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy,” June 26, 2012: 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33785/131201.pdf> (accessed May 19, 2020).
5 European Commission, “The Five President’s Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union,” June 22, 2015: <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en> (accessed May 19, 2020).
issuance of a promissory note, and the credit alloca-
tion incentives embedded in LTRO and TLRO. 
The ruling of Germany’s Constitutional Court should 
indeed be read as an unmistakably clear warning that 
the architecture of the European Monetary Union is 
inadequate. In order for the euro area to continue to 
exist, it has two options. The European Central Bank 
could expand its reach to compensate for the lack of 
budgetary and economic policy tools at the Europe-
an level. Alternatively, the EU could revise the TFEU so 
that structures of fiscal federalism could be set up that 
allow for more fiscal risk sharing in order to underpin 
the monetary union. It is improbable that the euro ar-
ea will thrive if neither of these two options is chosen.
Therefore, the most reasonable and consequential 
response to the BVerfG’s questions about the ECB’s 
proportionality assessment would be to pick up the 
project of strengthening the architecture of the euro 
area where it was left. Important contributions have 
already been made, for example the Four Presidents 
Report “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union”4 and the Five Presidents Report on “Complet-
ing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”5 that 
were published in 2012 and 2015, respectively.
The debate was not shelved because the economic, 
legal, and political fragilities of the euro area’s set-
up had gone away. Rather, progress was impeded 
by a lack of political will to genuinely address its ar-
chitectural weaknesses that the financial, sovereign 
debt, and banking crises had revealed. 
In essence, the judges of the BVerfG in Karlsruhe 
might have offered the EU the strongest possi-
ble political push for a real Hamiltonian moment – 
the explicit acknowledgement that monetary union 
The ruling is a warning 
that the euro area ar-
chitecture is inadequate
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requires common taxation, common spending, and 
common borrowing so as to effect, transparent-
ly and democratically, the transfers that are need-
ed and that are now taking place in the cracks and 
shadows of ECB’s operations. In an interesting twist 
of fate, this echoes debates within Germany about 
the operations of its own fiscal federalism, in partic-
ular those concerning the constitutional settlement 
of 2009 that enshrined the national schuldenbremse 
(“debt brake”) but have proven unable to end trans-
fers between the federal government and the coun-
try’s states and municipalities.6 
The intensely debated Franco-German initiative for the 
European Recovery Fund of May 187 is clearly import-
ant. It does not, however, constitute a Hamiltonian mo-
ment for the EU as it does not clearly foresee a com-
mon European tax that would back common borrowing. 
Germany’s Federal Minister of Finance, Olaf Scholz, has, 
however, already suggested that a response might re-
quire not only own resources, but also, more proba-
bly, some modification of Article 311 TFEU.8 Although 
encouraging, Germany’s approach has faced substan-
tial resistance by its traditional allies – Sweden, Den-
mark, Austria, and the Netherlands – who will test Ber-
lin’s ability to move the lines of the debate in those 
countries. 
This can, however, be a first move toward a far big-
ger project that would indeed be Europe’s Hamil-
tonian moment: the creation of an EU tax capacity 
with permission for the European Commission to is-
sue debt. Undoubtedly, if the EU raises taxes and is-
sues debt, national governments would first need to 
sanction this sharing of fiscal competence – possi-
bly by way of ratifying the necessary simplified trea-
ty revision. Because taxing power requires stronger 
representation and democratic accountability, this 
step would need to be accompanied by a stronger 
role for the European Parliament based upon a clear 
legal foundation.
6 Shahin Vallée, “Living a Lie,” Berlin Policy Journal, November/December 2019: <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/living-a-lie/> (accessed May 19, 2020).
7 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, “A French-German Initiative for the European Recovery from the Coronavirus Crisis,” Press Release 
Number 173/20, May 18, 2020: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/973812/1753772/414a4b5a1ca91d4f7146eeb2b39ee72b/2020-05-18-
deutsch-franzoesischer-erklaerung-eng-data.pdf?download=1> (accessed May 19, 2020).
8 Peter Dausend and Mark Schieritz, Interview with Olaf Scholz “Someone Has to Take the Lead” [in German], Die Zeit, May 19, 2020. 
Alexander Hamilton: First Secretary of the 
Treasury of the United States 
A member of the Constitutional Conven-
tion and a close ally of George Washington, 
Alexander Hamilton is widely credited with 
kick-starting American monetary union by 
launching the First National Bank of the United 
States, the precursor of an American Central 
Bank that helped unify America’s financial 
system. In reality, the United States only estab-
lished a unified central bank in 1913 – more 
than 120 years after Hamilton led the Treasury.
Hamilton is certainly responsible for the 
first essential steps in fiscal integration 
that empowered the federal government 
and eventually led to the economic, mone-
tary, and political integration of the nascent  
federation. Two steps were arguably the most 
critical: First, the establishment of a customs 
force, called the “Cutters,” which allowed taxes 
and duties on imports to be levied at a time 
when they were the central source of revenue 
for the government. And, second, the very first 
tariff bill, which, in January 1790, established 
a tax on whiskey. Although highly controver-
sial, it became the first source of income for 
the federal government. It was only on the 
basis of these revenues that Hamilton was 
able to convince state representatives of the 
need for issuing national (i.e. federal) debt and 
assuming the war debt of individual states. In 
only the few months between January and 
April 1790, when the assumption of war debt 
was put to a vote, Hamilton convinced the 
federation to mutualize the costs of the Rev-
olutionary War incurred by the states. This 
successful vote not only established the foun-
dation of American fiscal integration, but also 
the core of the federal government.
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THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Most fundamentally, the German Constitutional Court 
is asking whether the EU, at its core, is an associa-
tion of sovereign states bound by treaties of interna-
tional public law that organizes the sharing of certain 
competences, or whether it is a nascent supranation-
al constitutional, legal, and political order that frames 
the transnationalization of democracy. The BVerfG 
has responded to this question in the past, most im-
portantly with its ruling on the Maastricht and Lisbon 
Treaties. With those rulings, it built high obstacles to 
further integration by elevating its interpretation of 
both the budgetary competence of the Bundestag and 
the principles of democracy. Doing so has allowed the 
German court to set the stage for an elaborate dance 
between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg9 that has been 
going on for 30 years and has, so far, carefully avoided 
turning into a war of the judges. 
For many years, it was assumed that the German 
Constitutional Court would only need to rule against 
the European Court of Justice in exceptional cases, 
for example in order to preserve fundamental rights 
enshrined in the German Constitution. Instead, un-
der the guise of protecting German democracy, the 
BVerfG has created a broad pathway for legal chal-
lenges to European integration. It did so by combin-
ing the individual right of citizens to vote in a dem-
ocratic election with the principles of democracy 
established in the national constitution to create the 
means to limit and control the scope and extent of 
European integration. The court, for example, allows 
any plaintiff to consider that any action taken by the 
EU infringes on his or her basic democratic rights10 
– especially since its ruling of June 30, 2009, on the 
Lisbon Treaty that posited that the treaty, which had 
only come into force at the beginning of that year, 
had important democratic shortcomings. The BVer-
fG, therefore, considerably limited the expansion of 
EU competences, in particular in the fiscal realm. 
In sum, the principle of the supremacy of EU law 
raises fundamental questions from a German consti-
9 Stefan Kornelius, “Dance of the Judges” [in German], Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 6, 2020: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europa-tanz-der-
gerichte-1.4899062> (accessed May 19, 2020).
10 Maximilian Steinbeis, “We Super-Europeans,” Verfassungsblog, May 8, 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/we-super-europeans/> (accessed May 19, 2020).
11 As Peter Meier-Beck, a presiding judge at the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), argued: “The judgement of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of 5 May 2020, passed by seven votes to one, is an attack on the European Union as a legally constituted community of European democracies.”
See: Peter Meier-Beck, “Ultra Vires?”, D’Kart, May 11, 2020: <https://www.d-kart.de/en/blog/2020/05/11/ultra-vires/> (accessed May 19, 2020).
12 Katharina Pistor, “Germany’s Constitutional Court Goes Rogue,” Project Syndicate, May 8, 2020: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
german-constitutional-court-ecb-ruling-may-threaten-euro-by-katharina-pistor-2020-05> (accessed May 19, 2020)
13 Through its Maastricht Urteil, Lissabon Urteil, and judgments on the composition of the EP, the ESM Treaty, and the ECB action, among others, the BVerfG 
significantly limited the ability of Germany to participate in the EU. Of particular importance here is the judges’ reading of the Basic Law’s right to vote 
clause. See: Federico Fabbrini, “Suing the BVerfG,” Verfassungsblog, May 13, 2020: <https://verfassungsblog.de/suing-the-bverfg/> (accessed May 19, 
2020).
tutional perspective, which the constitutional court 
has now made explicit. By challenging the suprem-
acy of EU law, the court has invited others to follow 
suit with the risk of unravelling the entire legal fab-
ric of the EU.11 The BVerfG has, thus, opened Pando-
ra’s box;12 now the question is how the risk of such 
unravelling, including the undermining of the euro, 
can be contained. 
One possible response could be that the European 
Commission launches a formal infringement proce-
dure against the German Government. If success-
ful, it could force corrective action, possibly making 
it necessary for Germany to change its constitution, 
the so-called Basic Law. 
An alternative, or possibly an additional step follow-
ing an infringement procedure, could be a reform of 
the EU Treaties. Treaty change would not only clarify 
the legal order and primacy of EU law and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice over national legal systems; but 
it would also clarify the political settlement under-
pinning the EU and its federal nature. Together, such 
clarification would contribute to undoing the arse-
nal of constraints on further EU integration intro-
duced by the BVerfG13 over the last decades, there-
by clarifying the political and legal core of the EU. 
Such treaty changes could also bring about amend-
ments to Germany’s Constitution (and possibly those 
of other countries as well). If the German govern-
ment uses the BVerfG’s May 2020 ruling, its upcom-
ing Council presidency, and the impeding Confer-
ence on the Future of Europe to launch a real agenda 
of European institutional reforms, it would provide 
the best possible response to a ruling that – if not 
answered properly – could fester and rot the foun-
dations of both the EU and euro area. 
ATLAS, HERACLES, PERSEUS 
– AND HAMILTON
The German Constitutional Court might be inde-
pendent, but it helps shape political developments 
significantly. Over the last 30 years, it has framed 
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European integration in such a way that it has as-
sumed the role of a primus inter pares – first among 
equals – among Europe’s constitutional courts. This 
is not sustainable in the long run. 
Yet if it were seen in a forward-looking and deter-
mined way, the BVerfG’s recent ruling may have pos-
itive consequences, in particular because it could 
help promote force a change in public opinion and 
political attitude in Germany. Since its creation, 
especially since the financial crisis hit more than a 
decade ago, the monetary union has been gradually 
transformed. The need for stabilization and transfers 
has been exposed, but it has been resisted and min-
imized by European governments. This has, in turn, 
forced the European Central Bank to play a great-
er role – through indirect mutualization and mon-
etization. These measures were necessary to reduce 
acute fiscal distress and profound economic diver-
gence, as well as to avoid a possible break-up of the 
single currency. Under Mario Draghi’s leadership, 
the ECB played an extraordinary role in ending the 
crises in the euro area. But, as a result, European 
governments were allowed to stop short of engaging 
in stronger fiscal risk-sharing.
This situation has put the ECB in the mythologi-
cal role of Atlas, condemned by Zeus to hold up the 
celestial heavens for eternity at the edge of the earth. 
Atlas argues with Heracles – in this case, European 
governments – in order to enlist his support to hold 
the skies. Tellingly, Heracles comes to Atlas and they 
play a game of chicken in which each of them, in turn, 
cheats the other into holding the celestial sphere 
momentarily. As the BVerfG’s judgement makes clear, 
the time has now come for Heracles to liberate At-
las from his ordeal. It is economically, politically, and 
legally necessary that the architecture of the euro 
area is finally completed, including filling the need for 
stronger fiscal integration and the provision of demo-
cratic legitimacy at the EU level.
In the Greek myth, Perseus comes to Atlas and 
reveals the beheaded Medusa, freezing Atlas into 
a chain of mountains that touches the skies at the 
edge of the earth. The BVerfG is our Perseus and 
risks freezing into stone the European Central Bank 
with its beheaded Medusa ruling. 
14 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, “A French-German Initiative for the European Recovery from the Coronavirus Crisis,” Press Release 
Number 173/20, May 18, 2020: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/973812/1753772/414a4b5a1ca91d4f7146eeb2b39ee72b/2020-05-18-
deutsch-franzoesischer-erklaerung-eng-data.pdf?download=1> (accessed May 19, 2020).
Unfortunately, Greek myth did not allow for Hera-
cles to come to the rescue of Atlas. Doing so requires 
a different sort of hero in the manner of Alexan-
der Hamilton, who pushed forward the assumption 
of the debt accumulated by individual states during 
the Revolutionary War by a federal government – a 
real leap for common debt, but, first and foremost, 
for  allowing common fiscal revenues and common 
spending. The German Constitutional Court, for all 
its faults, might successfully tip the German debate, 
which has, for years, refused to face the reality that 
the monetary union can only operate on the basis of 
the federalization not only of its monetary policy, but 
also a portion of its fiscal policy. Such federalization 
will bring about difficult institutional and constitu-
tional changes, but – because muddling through has 
become economically, politically, and legally toxic – 
they have become necessary.
May 18’s Franco-German agreement14 certainly falls 
short of a real Hamiltonian moment in that it does 
not allow for the creation of a common tax to back 
common borrowing. It also does not force the subse-
quent political changes in representation and dem-
ocratic accountability that come with taxing pow-
er and that normally come with minting money. But, 
possibly, the agreement is a down payment on forc-
ing a real institutional and constitutional debate that 
will provoke a new settlement. If this is where we 
are headed, contrary to some of the certainly legally 
valid criticisms addressed to the BVerfG and its 
judges, the ruling would serve a useful purpose for 
Europe. 
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